The Karabakh Conflict and the Failure of Experts
Zoravik is proud to share this translation of Tigran Grigoryan’s article published in CivilNet on the problem of Western experts and their attempts to define our positions on the Karabakh conflict.
Grigoryan is a native of Stepanakert and provided Zoravik with the English translation of his piece from the original Armenian. The following published piece is Grigoryan’s provided translation with minimal editing from Zoravik members.
“The Karabakh Conflict and the Failure of Experts”
In recent decades, a distinct and exclusive community of experts and journalists dealing with the Karabakh conflict has emerged in the West. Over the years, members of that community have been granted a monopoly to shape narratives and discourses on the conflict. The members of this informal group have been the main sources of information and analytical content about the Karabakh conflict for decision-makers in Western capitals. They have written columns, scholarly articles, and books on the subject, and have had a serious impact on both international perceptions of the Karabakh conflict and the behavior of international actors.
It is noteworthy that this closed group of experts assumed two functions at once throughout these years:
1. They have been engaged in expert analysis and coverage of the processes taking place in the conflict zone.
2. They have been actively involved in Track 2-level initiatives by coordinating or simply being involved in various peace-building projects.
In the run-up to the Second Karabakh War, the work of this group of experts and journalists was often distinguished by a propensity to establish false equivalence between the parties on all issues. The goal was to appear objective and neutral. This community of experts had been actively promoting the Madrid Principles as well as proposals and mechanisms stemming from them. Moreover, these experts and journalists often assumed the functions of “moral arbiters” by regularly voicing various appeals and sententious assessments.
After the end of the 44-day Karabakh War, this community of experts and journalists became actively involved in the process of forming new narratives and discourses about the conflict. The false equivalence paradigm that prevailed in the pre-war period was replaced by the strategy of targeting the losing side (“victim blaming”) and legitimizing Azerbaijan’s actions.
In the post-war period, the assumption that Armenia’s position has been irrational and maximalist for the last twenty years came to the fore. It is claimed that Armenia’s long-term strategy in the settlement process was to strengthen the status quo by artificially delaying substantive talks. Armenia is presented as the bungler of the failed negotiation process. The main message of this interpretation is that Azerbaijan had no choice but to resolve the issue through war.
Such an approach, to put it mildly, does not correspond to reality. Since 1994, none of the Armenian leaders have denied the need to resolve the conflict through compromise. Moreover, in the last twenty years, there have been two realistic opportunities to sign a peace treaty in the Karabakh conflict settlement process: in Key West and in Kazan. In both cases, the Azerbaijani side made new demands at the last minute to thwart the negotiations.
Discussions about Armenia’s goal of strengthening the status quo have no factual basis as well. All the reports of fact-finding missions that have been sent to the conflict zone in recent decades, and of other reputable international organizations, state that Armenia has not pursued a policy of state-directed resettlement in the territories outside the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (that were under Armenian control before the Second Karabakh War.) Moreover, the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) 2019 report stated that Armenian authorities in some cases created artificial barriers for those wishing to settle in the above-mentioned areas. Had there been a policy of strengthening the status quo, the rapid settlement of these territories would have been a top priority for the state.
At the same time, the discussions about “maximalist” and “irrational” Armenia completely ignore the obvious fact that Azerbaijan has been preparing for war — and not a peaceful resolution — for at least the last decade. It is noteworthy that since September 27, 2020, the representatives of this community of experts have not directed any targeted criticism at Azerbaijan for starting a destructive war. They did not criticize Azerbaijan even though one of the three basic Madrid Principles advocated by the above-mentioned expert community for years is non-use of force.
After the war, this expert community has been completely ignoring the third Madrid Principle as well: the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Armenia is advised to forget about the past and look towards the future. This basically means that the Armenian side must renounce the fundamental rights of the people of Artsakh and come to terms with the post-war situation. This point is presented in the context of needing to take into account the new realities on the ground.
Armenian voices are also used to promote these ideas. It is quite interesting that only those Armenian public figures and experts whose opinions are in line with these post-war narratives are invited to almost all discussions and events on the conflict that take place in the West after the Second Karabakh War. The public figures and experts who dispute the veracity of the above-mentioned ideas are labeled as “nationalists.” In other words, an attempt is being made to predetermine the Armenian positions on the Karabakh conflict, instead of encouraging Armenia and the Armenian society to express those positions themselves. This phenomenon, of course, contains some elements of neo-colonialism.
The Second Karabakh War demonstrated, first and foremost, the moral bankruptcy of this expert community. None of the members of this group had the intellectual courage to condemn the military aggression of Azerbaijan and the war crimes committed by Baku during the war. Some of them even took part in propaganda events organized by the Azerbaijani authorities in the post-war period, giving them legitimacy.
Such behavior should be properly called out in Armenia. We can no longer tolerate dangerous ideas being spread under the guise of neutrality and impartiality in the context of the conflict. Armenia’s foreign policy must build its capability to confront and challenge these false narratives and discourses.
